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THE NEED FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE SCHOOLS:
A Model Rule
INTRODUCTION
In 1969 the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District' extended the freedom of symbolic
expression to the high school student within the school environment, as
long as the student ". . .neither interrupted school activities nor sought
to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others." 2 Unfortunately,
the Court presented a decision which the judiciary of the land has
abused and misused. Where Tinker dealt with political symbolism, other
student cases were concerned with student expression of an entirely
different nature.3 How can the wearing of a pantsuit in violation of a
dress code and participation in a demonstration,4 the flaunting of
school rules and regulations,' the right to choose speakers,6 and the
writing of underground newspapers7 be so quickly compared and
considered the same as political symbolic expression? (i.e., "political"
meaning governmental activities and policies).
Through the use of Tinker, many courts have been able either to
support or to defeat a school's attempt to curtail student activity. The
number of cases involving constitutional rights at school is so
voluminous that it would be impossible to attempt to digest them, much
less reconcile them.8 "Indeed, the welter of such cases in which a
vociferous child runs right from the schoolhouse door to the
courthouse door with his literature in hand has grown in recent years
beyond all proper proportion."9  The Supreme Court has denied
certiorari to ". . . several controversial federal court of appeals decisions
dealing with student conduct and discipline."' 0
Prior to the 1960's, American students seldom appeared in the courts
demanding their individual rights: the school's in loco parentis
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
2. Id. at 514.
3. Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEo.
L. J. 37, 40 (1970).
4. Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
5. Graham v. Houston Independent School Dist., 335 F. Supp. 1164 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
6. Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).
7. Baker v. Downey City Board of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Sullivan v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Scoville v.
Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970);
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Quarterman v. Byrd,
453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Riseman .v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971).
8. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 (D. Md. 1972).
9. Id.
10. Haskell, supra note 3, at 39.
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authority' ' was an accepted practice. The cases that did appear were
limited to religion,'2 learning of foreign languages,' 3 racial segrega-
tion,'" and patriotism in the schools.' " The mushrooming of students'
demands to be heard-"to do their own thing"-became apparent with
the coming of the '60's. The post-war babies had become high school
students, existing in a world with the constant mutual terror of the cold
war and ever-present threat of atomic warfare. The students' previous
preoccupation with panty raids and prom queens had changed to
marches for peace and sit-ins for equal rights. The threats and pressulres
of daily life had developed a population of young students who wished
to be treated equitably and to be accorded the right to speak out
against those aspects of life that threatened their very existence or
contravened their moral concepts.
Since forty percent of the high school student's waking hours is
spent within the confines of a public school building,' 6 it is not
surprising that the young student felt compelled to express his
discontent and disappointment on school grounds. School districts
throughout the country have attempted to promulgate rules which
would allow the student his constitutional right of free expression,
while at the same time preserve decorum within the school. For various
reasons courts have held many of the rules by school boards
unconstitutional as violating freedom of speech under the first
and fourteenth amendments.' ' It is the purpose of this comment to
establish a model rule. This rule will be based on a review and analysis
of the relevant cases and will present definite guidelines to strike a
balance between student's rights and the school's need for orderly
administration of its pupils' conduct.
THE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT v. THE ADULT
In 1969 a federal district court held that "[s]tudents are persons
under the Constitution; they have the same rights and enjoy the same
privileges as adults."' 8 But is this really the status of the high school
11. For a complete discussion on the loco parentis position of the schools, see Goldstein,
The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct and
Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373 (1969).
12. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (released time for religious training).
13. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (teaching of German).
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 373 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966).
15. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (saluting the flag in school).
16. Private schools are not controlled by the fourteenth amendment. See Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d (2d Cir. 1968).
17. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 343 F. Supp. 487 (D. Md. 1972) (too broad); Quarterman v.
Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971) (lack of criteria to be followed by school authorities);
Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
(this case did not meet minimal standards of procedural due process of law).
18. Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 99 (N.D., Ill. 1969).
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student? Is he generally regarded by the judiciary and Congress as a
mature individual, eligible to accept the responsibilities of citizenship?
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Tinker, said that,
"... First Amendment rights of children are [not] co-extensive with
those of adults."' 9 In Schwartz v. Schuker2 0 the court ruled that
"[high school students are] in a much more adolescent and immature
stage of life and less able to screen fact from propaganda."' 2 ' In case
after case dealing with the constitutional rights of the high school
student, we are continuously reminded that a student, below the age of
eighteen, is naive and impressionable; he is in need of guidance and
restriction.
The laws show that the child under eighteen is definitely a
subordinated individual. Two significant laws apply to the eighteen year
old. The first of these bestows upon the young person the responsibility
of serving his country through military service.2 2 The second is the
twenty-sixth amendment to the Constitution, entitling eighteen
year-olds to vote. The states have distinguished eighteen years as the age
when the child becomes an adult. In thirty-two states, delinquent
youngsters are within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until their
eighteenth birthday. More than twenty-five states do not permit an
unconditional driver's license until eighteen. Twenty-seven states
prohibit youngsters below the age of eighteen to work without
permits. 2 3 Thus we see that society has clearly established a different
standard of societal control of persons under eighteen: below eighteen,
individuals are subject to more stringent restrictions than are necessary
for adults.
THE NEED FOR REGULATIONS
Education is not just the formal study of traditional subjects; the
school must also help to prepare the student for citizenship. The
19. 393 U.S. at 515 (concurring opinion); first stated by Justice Stewart in Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968).
20. 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
21. Id. at 242.
22. Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 454 (1970).
§ 454. Persons liable for training and service.
(a) Age limits; training in National Security Training Corps; physical and mental
fitness; adequate training facilities; assignment to stations and units; training
period; medical specialist categories.
Except as otherwise provided in this title [sections 451, 453, 454, 455, 456, and
458-71 of this Appendix], every male citizen of the United States and every male
alien admitted for permanent residence, who is between the ages of 18 years and
6 months and 26 years, at the time fixed for his registration, or who attains the
age of 18 years and 6 months after having been required to register pursuant to
section 3 of this title [section 453 of this Appendix], or who is otherwise liable as
provided in section 6(h) of this title [section 456(h) of this Appendix], shall be
liable for training and service in the Armed Forces of the United States ....
23. For a state-by-state analysis, see Age at Which a Child Attains Adult Status, READER'S
DIGEST 1972 ALMANAC AND YEARBOOK, at 290-91, (N.Y. 1972).
[Vol. 2
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"informal" aspect of the high school's curriculum must allow the
student to develop his mind, and to be able to question, analyze, and
think as a mature individual. Creativity and open discussion of politics
and culture must not be prohibited because of rigorous regulations.
Rules are necessary to maintain an orderly educational center, but these
rules must be reasonable and not overbearing. "The vigilant protection
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools."2"4
The Supreme Court has continuously been concerned with the
problem of balancing the authority of school officials with the
fundamental safeguards of the Constitution.2 s The courts have shown
freedom of speech is not without limit and not absolute under all
crcumstances.2 6 However, in order to have a healthy diversity of
opinion among students, a rule must not prohibit the student's right to
speak. Where else, if not in the school, should there be the right to
discuss issues openly and express opinions freely? By denying the
student his right to express himself, the school may be hampering the
student's quest for further knowledge. A rule formulated by the school
must strike a balance between the pursuits of a creative, thinking mind
and the preservation of orderliness. The Supreme Court in Terminiello
v. Chicago' ' said:
[A] function of free speech ... is to invite dispute. It
may ... serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. .. . That is why freedom of speech,
though not absolute... is nevertheless protected against censor-
ship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest [Citing cases].
There is no room ... for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas ....
(emphasis added).
By contrast in 1968 the 5th Circuit recognized the need for order.
Unlike Terminiello where the first amendment claim was more
24. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
25. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
26. States may ban the use of so-called "fighting words," epithets of personal abuse which,
when addressed to men of common intelligence, would be words likely to cause the
average citizen to fight. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Although the first amendment protects non-verbal
communication, conduct is not guaranteed the same amount of protection as pure
speech. "[C ]ertain public conduct is subject to regulation even though it is related to
expression." Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
92 S.Ct. 1188 (1972).
27. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
28. Id. at 4.
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prominent, the court upheld a principal's right to prescribe the length
of a student's hair, ruling that this prescription was not in violation of
free speech:
The interest of the state in maintaining an effective and
efficient school system is of paramount importance. That which
so interferes or hinders the state in providing the best education
possible for its people, must be eliminated or circumscribed as
needed. 2 9
SCHOOL RULES AND WHY THEY HAVE FAILED
In an attempt to develop a firm and valid rule for the school districts
to follow, it is necessary to consider the various rules that have been
developed and why, through the judicial process, they have failed.
Although Tinker does not apply to the underground press or to speech
as one normally thinks of speech, it is important to mention the failure
of the rule that was there involved, because nearly every case dealing
with student rights seems to base its primary argument on the language
of Tinker.
The Supreme Court there held that. if it could not be shown that
students' activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school the prohibition could not be sustained.3 0
In Tinker, the wearing of a black (symbolic) armband was singled out
for regulation. The school officials had made such a regulation only
days before in anticipation of trouble: ". . .any student wearing an
armband to school [will] be asked to remove it, and if he [refuses] he
[will] be suspended until he [returns] without the armband."'" The
Supreme Court held that ". .undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression."" The Court established in Tinker a test for all schools to
apply when dealing with the problem of balancing individual rights with
the management of the school:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must
be able to show that its action was caused by something more
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly
where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere
29. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 856 (1968).
30. 393 U.S. at 513.
31. Id. at 504.
32. Id. at 508.
[Vol. 2
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with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained. 3 "
It is interesting to note that the American Civil Liberties Union expands
on the Tinker rule by making it somewhat more specific:
Neither the faculty advisors nor the principal should prohibit
the publication or distribution of material except when such
publication or distribution would clearly endanger the health or
safety of the students, or clearly and imminently threaten to
disrupt the educational process, or might be of a libelous
nature . . . .31 (emphasis added)
The School regulation in Tinker was judged invalid; the educational
environment was in no way disturbed by the outlawed activity. In
trying to develop a rule for all school districts, a definite problem
exists: what may be the needs and problems in one locale may have
absolutely no validity or significance in another (e.g., rules prohibiting
an activity in a New York City school may have no bearing on a
midwest farmland school). As an example of this, consider the case of
Guzick v. Drebus.3" As in Tinker, the school in Guzick had an
unwritten regulation commonly understood to state that students
would not be permitted to wear emblems, buttons, or other insignia on
school property during school activity. Two boys were suspended from
school for wearing anti-war buttons. Where Tinker found no evidence
of school disturbance, Guzick found that the rule was an old and
necessary restriction since the racial situation there was potentially
explosive. If the students' activity had been permitted, the court felt
that it would be disruptive to the decorum of the school. The rule was
upheld and the activity prohibited.
The court in Guzick carefully distinguished Tinker as a case of
invidious discrimination: viz., black arm bands; if the discrimination
were eliminated (i.e. all insignia), the rules were justifiable. The case
further explained Tinker, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. The
prohibition in Guzick was an overall condemnation, a blanket
provision, encompassing all symbolic buttons or insignia. The Court
may have considered that the universality of the subject matter and
enforcement of the rule in Guzick overcame the invidious discrimina-
tion in the Tinker case, and served as further clarification of Tinker. 36
33. Id. at 509.
34. American Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom in the Secondary Schools 11-12
(Sept. 1968).
35. 305 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ohio 1969), affd, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 948 (1971).
36. The writer cannot accept this reasoning. A universal or indiscriminate rule may eventually
assist in eradicating the basic right and add in the erosion of the basic freedoms. Rules
are necessary, but they must not be arbitrarily restrictive. Guidelines to protect
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In 1969 a district court in New York took a different tack when, in
Schwartz v. Schuker,3' they did not even consider the validity of the
claims of the plaintiff that the rule involved was unconstitutional.
Jeffrey Schwartz, a student at Jamaica High School, was asked to stop
distributing unsponsored newspapers on school grounds. The school
officials claimed that he was violating a school rule that required
students to seek permission before distributing written material. Nine
months later Jeffrey was once again apprehended for distributing
papers. When he refused to surrender his unofficial papers, he was
dismissed from school. Although Jeffrey was not officially readmitted
to school, a few weeks later he attended classes. The court ruled that
gross disrespect of administrators and rules of a school is sufficient
reason for suspension and expulsion; order on school grounds was far
more important than the constitutional issues that the student tried to
raise. The court stressed that respect and obedience are what is
important when dealing with students.
In conjunction with this case is Graham v. Houston Independent
School District.3 8 Here, the students knew that there was a rule (that
permission was required prior to distributing written material), but
obviously the students were purposely flaunting the regulation. If the
students, by flaunting the regulation, were attempting to put the rule to
a test, they did not succeed; the court never considered the validity of
the rule, they considered only the fact that the students were
deliberately flaunting authority. "This court cannot agree . . . that any
activity involving speech, even when coupled with gross disobedience of
school disciplinarians, must be tested against the disruption stand-
ard."
3 9
Interestingly enough, and in contrast, the judiciary would not
consider the issue of gross disobedience of misconduct in Scoville v.
Board of Education of Joliet Township High School District 204,
County of Will, Illinois.4 0 The students had published "Grass High,"
brought it to school and sold it to sixty people for fifteen cents each.
The paper consisted of essays, poetry, reviews, and editorials. The
problem arose over the editorial which criticized the school administra-
tion by making an offensive, though not libelous, statement. The
students were dismissed from school and applied to the court for relief.
The school, in suspending the pupils, had applied an Illinois statute
one's rights must be incorporated when dealing with restricting one's rights. See
Conclusion, infra.
In short, the writer feels that although the rule was upheld as valid it should have
failed. The rule was overly broad. The prohibition of all buttons was too restrictive. A
rule must not group and categorize; it must be specific. The rule in Guzick is faulty and
in creating a basic rule, safeguards must be established to protect against flaws in-
herent in the Guzick rule.
37. 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
38. 335 F. Supp. 1164 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
39. Id. at 1166.
40. 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
[Vol. 2
Need for Prior Restraint in the Schools
which gave the School Board the power "[t] o expel pupils guilty of
gross disobedience or misconduct."' ' The court felt that application of
this rule was an invasion of the students' constitutional rights.
While recognizing the need of effective discipline in operating
schools, the law requires that the school rules be related to the
state interest in the production of well-trained intellects with
constructive critical stances, lest students' imaginations, intel-
lects and wills be unduly stifled or chilled.4 2
In Schwartz and Graham the theory that order must be maintained so
as to accomplish the goals of education was upheld, but Scoville held
that under the test of Tinker, the school board failed to show the
substantial threat of disruption. Schwartz and Graham never applied
the Tinker disruption test.
In Zucker v. Panitz,4  Judge Metzner pointed out that if a school has
a rule it must not use it arbitrarily, but universally. A group of students
wished to publish in the school newspaper an advertisement opposing
the Viet Nam War. The editor, Laura Zucker, approved the copy but
was informed by Dr. Panitz, the principal, that the advertisement would
be in violation of a school rule. The rule stated: [N] o advertising will be
permitted which expresses a point of view on any subject not related to
New Rochelle High School." 4 4 The judge showed that the school paper
was open to editorials and letters concerned with outside matters and
obviously a forum open to the free expression of ideas. Therefore, the
rule failed because it was applied arbitrarily.
An action for relief against a school committee regulation was
brought by Riseman in Riseman v. School Committee of City of
Quincy.4 The plaintiff sought permission to distribute literature of a
political nature on the school grounds. The committee turned down
Riseman's request because of the standing rule:
Pupils, staff members, or the facilities of the school may not
be used in any manner for advertising or promoting the interests
of any community or non-school agency or organization
without the approval of the School Committee. Exceptions to
the above rule are:
a. The Superintendent of Schools may cooperate in the many
activities of the community providing such operation does
not infringe on the school program or diminish the amount
of time devoted to the school program.
b. The Superintendent of Schools may authorize the use of
films and materials or programs where the educational value
41. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 122, § 10-22.6 (1967).
42. 425 F.2d at 14.
43. 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. Id. at 103.
45. 439 F.2d 148 (1st Cir. 1971).
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of the material considerably offsets any incidental advertis-
ing disadvantages. 4 6
The court held that the committee was wrong in categorizing Riseman's
leaflets as material described within the rule. The regulation failed
because it was vague, overbroad, and did not reflect an effort to
minimize the adverse effect of prior restraint.' ' The court also
suggested that guidelines for distribution-time, place, and manner of
distribution-should be instituted into the rules.
In Texas, a district court held that a restriction was overbroad. The
case, Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District,4 8 involved Dan
Sullivan and Mike Fischer, who were seniors at Sharpstown High
School. The school was new, and the students were dissatisfied with the
administration. They printed an off-campus newspaper, Pflashlyte, in
which they wrote of their discontent. The papers were not distributed
on school grounds, and pupils were asked not to take the papers into
the school. However, the newspaper did come to the attention of the
school's principal, and the students were expelled. They asked the court
to adjudge the rule under which they were expelled unconstitutional.
The rule stated: "The school principal may make such rules and
regulations that may be necessary in the administration of the school and
in promoting its best interests. He may enforce obedience to any
reasonable and lawful command." 4 9 The court criticized the vagueness
of what was meant by "in promoting its best interests." After all, what
type of evaluations may be made by this statement? "The high school
too is changing and generalities can no longer serve as standards of
behavior when the right to obtain an education hangs in the balance.
This regulation is unconstitutional for both 'vagueness' and 'over-
breadth....... Io The court makes no issue of the fact that the students
knew nothing of the rule prior to the incident.
Another federal district court (Maryland) again held that a rule
was overly broad, in the recent case of Baughman v. Freienmuth.5 ' The
students had distributed literature, a "position paper", in violation of a
Montgomery County regulation. They challenged the regulation on the
grounds that the rule was unconstitutional and, therefore, violated their
rights.
Under the following procedures, student publications produced
without school sponsorship may be distributed in schools:
* * * * * *
46. Id. at 148-49 n.1.
47. Id. at 148.
48. 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
49. Id. at 1345.
50. Id. at 1346.
51. 343 F. Supp. 487,491 (D. Md. 1972).
[Vol. 2
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d). A copy must be given to the principal for his review. (He
may require that the copy be given him up to three school
days prior to its general distribution.) If, in the opinion of
the principal, the publication contains libelous or obscene
language, advocates illegal actions, or is grossly insulting to
any group or individual, the principal shall notify the
sponsors of the publication that its distribution must stop
forthwith or may not be initiated, and state his reasons
therefor. The principal may wish to establish a publications
review board composed of staff, students, and parents to
advise him in such matters." 2 (emphasis added)
The court held that, although the rule did not require a time limit for
the principal's decision, simple rewording would correct this defect.
However, the words, "advocates illegal action, or is grossly insulting to
any group or individual" provide the fatal expression which renders the
rule unconstitutionally vague.
[I] n order to keep within the pale of permissive restraint, it
appears that the guideline with respect to inflammatory
material must keep fairly close to the 'forecast of disruption'
language.... [T]he standards relating to advocacy of illegal
action and gross insult seem to be too broad under prevailing
notions of student rights.' I
In Baker v. Downey City Board of Education 4 the issue of
obscenity in an underground paper was discussed. Students are entitled
to criticize and speak out on issues that they feel need comment;
however, "...First Amendment rights to free speech do not require the
suspension of decency in the expression of their views and ideas."' '
The students were not expelled because they spoke out against the
administration, but because of the indecent manner of their expression.
Though no definite school rule was broken, the rule of common
decency was transcended. Therefore, the school did not fail in
producing a valid rule, the students failed by abusing their rights.
The Second Circuit in Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 6
held the following policy rule concerning distribution of student
publications to be invalid:
Distribution of Printed or Written Matter:
The Board of Education desires to encourage freedom of
52. Id. at 489.
53. Id. at 491.
54. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
55. Id. at 527.
56. 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
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expression and creativity by its students subject to the
following limitations:
No person shall distribute any printed or written matter on
the grounds of any school or in any school building unless the
distribution of such materials shall have prior approval by the
school administration.
In granting or denying approval, the following guidelines shall
apply:
No material shall be distributed which, either by its content
or by the manner of distribution itself, will interfere with the
proper and orderly operation and discipline of the school, will
cause violence or disorder, or will constitute an invasion of the
rights of others.' 5
In Eisner, the court ruled that the above rule was neither vague nor
overbroad but the court asked, "... . to what extent and under what
circumstance does the Board intend to permit school authorities to
supress criticism of their own actions and policies?"' ' The Board in its
policy failed to specify a definite brief period within which the review
would be completed, by whom, and how the material would be
submitted. Although the rule was not vague, the word "distribution"
was. The court then noted that more than likely the Board intended
"distribution" to refer to a "substantial distribution", but it failed to
say this. The youths had wished to hand out a newspaper, and objected
to the Board's rule making them request permission to publish an
off-campus newspaper.
In Eisner the court felt that the Board's policy did not constitute an
unconstitutional prior restraint upon the student. In addition the court
said that the principal must not be burdened with numerous tasks, and
therefore, ruled out the procedural safeguards of Freedman v.
Maryland." 9 In Freedman, the court praised the procedural safeguards
provided in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown:6 0
[S] ubdivision 2 ... which provides that the persons sought to
be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within one
day after joinder of issue and a decision shall be rendered by the
court within two days of the conclusion of the trial.'6
To guard against the hazards of prior restraint it might be advisable for
the school board to institute a right of appeal for the student. An
administrator is only a human and it's indeed probable that such a
person may be sensitive to criticism. How can an administrator who is
criticized fairly judge the reasonableness of a disputed commentary? An
57. Id. at 805.
58. Id. at 809.
59. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
60. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
61. Id. at 439.
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appeal board would either reinforce the official or give the student
another chance.
In another case, Quarterman v. Byrd,6 2 the court adjudged the
following rule to be a violation of student rights:
7. Each pupil is specifically prohibited from distributing, while
under school jurisdiction, any advertisements, pamphlets,
printed material, written material, announcements or other
paraphernalia without the express permission of the princi-
pal of the school.
6
1
The plaintiff was suspended for the infraction of Rule 7. The rule was
found to be invalid because it did not discuss any criteria for the school
official to employ in determining the permissibility of a written
document. No mention is made of "substantial disruption" nor
"sufficient interference with school activities." In each of the
aforegoing cases something was amiss. Now, the remaining question is,
can all of these cases that corrected school rules be compiled and
synthesized into a constitutionally sound rule?
CONCLUSION
The atmosphere of a school is much different from that of society as
a whole. The school has but a few hours each day to present to its
students ideas and concepts, both complicated and involved. The
students are young and easily distracted. Order must reign to maintain
the proper decorum in which the student can learn. The rules at times
may appear strict and overbearing, but the ever-present need for order
must be controlling. If the rules are reasonable and necessary to aid in
maintaining an educational atmosphere, then they are acceptable. Of
course, a juvenile has the right to free expression. He may speak out on
any issue, but he must not place in jeopardy his fellow students' right
to an education.
A minor student is a citizen, but he is not entitled to the same rights
and privileges as an adult. Just as society controls particular actions of
the adult, the school society must control particular actions of the
student.6 4 Society makes specific demands on the adult. Schools
likewise have their own set of demands for the student. Rules that will
62. 453 F.2d at 59-60.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 527 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The court
on this matter held: "The right to criticize and to dissent is protected to high school
students but they may be more strictly curtailed in the mode of their expression and
in other manners of conduct than college students or adults. The education process
must be protected and educational programs properly administered."
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balance both the student's right to free expression with the school's
right to order are, accordingly, ideal.
Thus a student exists in a controlled environment, but the controls
must not be so stringent that they stifle the creativity of the developing
mind. The controls are necessary to achieve the school's goal of
education. An inner struggle exists between the student's demand for
free expression and the school's demand for order; it is truly a situation
of expression versus education. On the one hand, there is the protection
of the individual's freedom of expression; on the other, the overall
objective of school districts to educate the multitude of students in
their charge-one versus hundreds. A balance, therefore, must be found
that will not hamper the mechanism of education, but yet must not
arbitrarily nor totally muzzle the student's right.
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States,
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions,
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the
Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes.6 s
The remaining task is to present a rule which is constitutionally valid
and applicable to all school districts. The rule, to be valid, must be
specific and contain precise steps of procedure. The rule must provide
safeguards to protect the student's constitutional freedom.
It is... essential that legislation aimed at protecting children
from allegedly harmful expression ... be clearly drawn and that
the standards adopted be reasonably precise so that ... those
that administer [the law] will understand its meaning and
application.6 6
The following is a model rule developed from review and analysis of the
cases relevant to the subject of students' rights of expression.
Rule 1.
No person shall distribute more than 10 copies of any
advertisements, pamphlets, announcements, booklets, leaf-
lets, written material, printed material, nor other literary
paraphernalia on the grounds of any school or school
65. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
66. People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 313, 206 N.E.2d 333, 335, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1965).
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building including the area immediately adjacent to the
school, without prior permission by the principal.
To understand Rule 1 better, consider its formulation. In Eisner,
Judge Kaufman questioned the use of the word "distribution." If the
Board had meant a substantial distribution, they should have worded
their rule in a more specific manner. 6 7  Because of this, Rule 1
specifically states what constitutes a substantial distribution-"more
than 10 copies." The listing of the various forms of written or printed
material is derived from the actual rule that existed for the Cumberland
County schools in North Carolina as discussed in the Quarterman case.
Because the rule covered all areas of written or printed material, it is
adopted directly. The inclusion of the words "the area immediately
adjacent to the school" comes from the holding in Baker. In this case




A copy of material falling under Rule 1 must be left at the
principal's office for his approval at least two school days
prior to its general distribution.
As shown by Eisner, the school board rules should include time,
place, and manner by which a student will submit his material for
approval.6 9 Justice Northrop, in Baughman, reiterated the need for set
procedures for students to follow for approval:
As to the details of the submission, it is clear that no particular
method is mandated by the cases, but there should be a
provision setting forth how may copies, where, and at what
times, etc., the material is to be submitted for screening.7 o
Rule 3.
If the principal feels that the material contains libelous or
obscene language, that the material would endanger the
67. 440 F.2d at 811. Judge Kaufman said:
[W le believe that the proscription against 'distributing' written or printed material
without prior consent is unconstitutionally vague.... We assume, therefore, that
the Board contemplates that it will require prior submission only when there is
to be a substantial distribution of written material, so that it can reasonably be
anticipated that in a significant number of instances there would be a likelihood
that the distribution would disrupt school operations.
68. 307 F. Supp. at 526:
IT ]he fact the acts which resulted in the distribution on campus were not actually
performed on campus is of no consequence. The school authorities are responsible
for the morals of the students while going to and from school, as well as during
the time they are on campus.
69. 440 F.2d at 810: "Although the Board's regulation passes muster as authorizing
prior restraints, we believe it is constitutionally defective in its lack of procedure for
prior submission by students for school administration approval, of written material
before 'distribution.'"
70. 343 F. Supp. at 492.
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health or safety of the students, or that the material clearly
threatens the substantial order of the school, he may find it
unsuitable for distribution.
According to Quarterman, in order to have a valid rule, criteria must
be established for the principal to follow when making his decision as
to the suitability of the submitted material.7 1
The statement "contains libelous and obscene language" is taken
directly from the Montgomery County regulation as shown in the
Baughman case.
The wording "the material would endanger the health and safety of
the students" is derived from the American Civil Liberties Union
bulletin. 2 The bulletin further states that "[s] uch judgment, however,
should never be exercised because of disapproval or disagreement with
the article in question."
'7 3
The latter part of Rule 2 is based upon the Tinker test. The principal
must consider what is involved and how it will affect his school. If he
can fairly say that a disruption of the orderly atmosphere will occur,
then he has substantial reason for disallowing the activity. In Blackwell
v. Issaquena County Board of Education 4 the Fifth Circuit held that
the evidence showed the wearing of "freedom buttons" caused a
commotion, loud noise, and harassment; the school was disturbed;
teaching was interrupted. Therefore, the regulation was reasonable. In
contrast, Tinker held that the rule forbidding black armbands was not
necessary. There was no possibility of disturbance, only an "apprehen-
sion of disturbance." In Tinker, the court said:
In order.., to justify prohibition of a particular expression
of opinion, [the school] must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no
showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the
prohibition cannot be sustained.7 "
Rule 4.
Three school days after the copy has been left at the
principal's office, the principal must inform the distributors
of the eligibility or ineligibility of their document and he
must give reasons for his decision. The principal's findings
should be posted on a prominent bulletin board. Failure of
71. 453 F.2d at 59.
72. American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 34, at 12.
73. Id.
74. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
75. 393 U.S. at 509.
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the principal to comply with this rule shall be deemed
automatic approval of the matter in question.
This rule requires the principal to report his findings within a specific
brief time. His decision must be made public so that no questions will
be raised. In Eisner the school board was charged with failing to
designate a specific time period within which the principal must
determine the permissibility of the material.7 6 Justice Northrop in
Baughman also claimed that a rule to be valid must establish a time
limit.7" Therefore, based upon these two cases, a model rule must
include procedures for the principal to follow.
The principal has a difficult task. What may appear to him to have an
obvious potential danger of disrupting the educational environment
may appear perfectly harmless to someone else. Thus, there is need for
an appeal procedure.
Rule 5.
If the opinion of the principal is objectionable to the
distributors, they may appeal his decision to a standing
appeal panel. The panel will consist of the P.T.A. president,
one teacher elected by the students at large, the president of
the student council, one student elected annually by the
students at large, one parent elected annually by the P.T.A.,
and one teacher selected by the principal.
Both Eisner and Quarterman call for an expeditious review
procedure. The Quarterman court stated: "What is lacking in the
present regulation, and what renders its attempt at prior restraint
invalid, is the absence.. . of any procedural safeguards in the form of
'an expeditious review procedure' of the decision of the school
authorities." 7 8
Rule 6.
At the end of the appeal hearing, the panel will have one day
in which to reach its decision. This decision will be posted for
all interested parties to see. If a tie exists, the principal's
decision will hold.
Since in Eisner and Baughman the courts held that the principal must
reach his decision within a brief time, it seems appropriate to extend
76. 440 F.2d at 810: "The policy as presently written is wholly deficient in this respect for
it prescribes no period of time in which school officials must decide whether or not to
permit distribution."
77. 343 F. Supp. at 492: "The rule does not say when the principal must make his
decision, but it appears to the Court that if the rule were re-worded to say the principal
must make his decision as to allowance or disallowance of distribution within a brief
time certain after submission of the material .. . this re-wording would cure the defect."
78. 453 F.2d at 59.
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these decisions and apply them to the appeal board's decisions. If a
definite time period is not established, then the board could postpone
its decision and the relevance of the issue could be totally lost.
Rule 7.
If students wantonly defy the procedures set forth in these
bylaws, they will subject themselves to suspension.
The wording of Rule 7 draws upon the holdings of Schwartz 9 and
Graham. " As both cases showed, the court would not consider the
constitutionality of the rules; the mere fact that students flaunted the
rules was sufficient for the court. The model rule has established a
precise procedure for students to follow. If students cannot abide by
these regulations which are designed to protect their rights as well as
the school environment, they leave the school no choice but to punish
them for their abuse of authority. The consequences should be clear
and known.
Thus the above represents a model rule which strives to preserve the
educational process, but yet does not unreasonably restrict the
students' right of expression. It is admittedly a heavy load for the
principal, but as the head administrator of the school, it is part of his
responsibility to balance the rights of the student with the needs of the
school. Today's student is tomorrow's citizen who must carry forth the
spirit of the Constitution. As James Madison said:




(ANNOTATED IN CONCLUSION, INFRA)
Rule 1.
No person shall distribute more than 10 copies of any advertise-
ments, pamphlets, announcements, booklets, leaflets, written mate-
rial, printed material, nor other literary paraphernalia on the ground
79. 298 F. Supp. at 242: "Gross disrespect and contempt for the officials of an educational
institution may be justification not only for suspension but also for expulsion of a stu-
dent."
80. 335 F. Supp. at 1166: "[Gross disobedience of school disciplinarians [cannot] be
tested against the disruption standard."
81. A somewhat thorough search was made to establish the authenticity of this statement.
To date the only proof that James Madison ever said these words is an inscription on the
facade of the James Madison High School in Brooklyn, New York. Mr. Rubin Kravitz,
Head of the Social Studies Department of the school, has said that although no definite
writing of Madison contains this quote, it encompasses Mr. Madison's "general ap-
proach to education"; perhaps some previous statement of Madison's was expanded
upon when it came time to chisel the words into the wall of the school.
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of any school or school building including the area immediately
adjacent to the school, without prior permission by the principal.
Rule 2.
A copy of material falling under Rule 1 must be left at the principal's
office for his approval at least two school days prior to its general
distribution.
Rule 3.
If the principal feels that the material contains libelous or obscene
language, that the material would endanger the health or safety of
the students, or that the material clearly threatens the substantial
order of the school, he may find it unsuitable for distribution.
Rule 4.
Three school days after the copy has been left at the principal's
office the principal must inform the distributors of the eligibility or
ineligibility of their document, and he must give reasons for his
decisions. The principal's findings should be posted on a prominent
bulletin board. Failure of the principal to comply with this rule shall
be deemed automatic approval of the matter in question.
Rule 5.
If the opinion of the principal is objectionable to the distributors,
they may appeal his decision to a standing appeal panel. The panel
will consist of the P.T.A. president, one teacher elected by the
students at large, the president of the student council, one student
elected annually by the students at large, one parent elected annually
by the P.T.A., and one teacher selected by the principal.
Rule 6.
At the end of the appeal hearing, the panel will have one day in
which to reach its decision. This decision will be posted for all
interested parties to see. If a tie exists, the principal's decision will
hold.
Rule 7.
If students wantonly defy the procedure set forth in these bylaws,
they will subject themselves to suspension.
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